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Abstract  
We examine the effectiveness of environmental provisions in North-South preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) focusing on their important design feature – different enforcement 
mechanisms. These mechanisms vary significantly across PTAs signed by the European 
Union (EU) and the United States (US). We argue that both US and EU PTAs with 
environmental provisions will be effective in instigating environmental policy change in 
partner countries, although the timing of the effect will vary significantly. We predict that 
environmental reform in US PTA partner countries will occur during the negotiation process 
due to a fear of sanctions, while similar reform in EU PTA partners will happen during 
agreement implementation as a result of the EU’s approach emphasizing policy dialogue. 
However, we also argue that the success of these provisions in North-South PTAs across 
developing countries will depend on the strength of civil society. Specifically, we expect that 
EU PTAs will be effective only in countries with strong institutional structures supporting 
civil society learning, while the sanctions approach in US PTAs ensures effective 
environmental reform even in partners with weak civil societies. We test our hypotheses 
using statistical estimations of EU and US PTAs with environmental provisions on countries’ 
environmental policy reform measured by Yale University’s index of environmental 
protection and the signing of multilateral environmental treaties.   
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1. Introduction 
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have become a major feature of today’s global 
economy, as countries rush to liberalize trade on the bilateral basis, following the deadlocks 
in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The European Union (EU)
1
 and the United States 
(US), as the two leading economies, have signed up to date the highest number of PTAs, 
especially with developing countries, competing with each other for access to new markets 
(see Manger 2009). These North-South PTAs increasingly tackle not only trade liberalization 
matters but also address many trade-related aspects, such as intellectual property rights, 
investment, and labor standards to name a few, providing the bargaining leverage for 
developed countries negotiating bilateral agreements with their counterparts in the developing 
world. Among these provisions, environmental standards have become a regular feature of 
PTAs signed by both the EU and the US who require trading partners to maintain an adequate 
level of environmental protection (see below) when they enter into preferential trading 
relations with them. Despite the ubiquity of such provisions and their potential importance for 
improving environmental protection and achieving sustainable development, the vast 
literature on PTAs remains silent about possible effects of environmental standards.  
In this paper, we try to address this gap by investigating the extent to which 
environmental standards in EU and US PTAs are effective in terms of improving 
environmental policies in partner countries and through what mechanisms. We examine the 
effect of the design of environmental standards on policy outcomes, as this design varies 
widely between PTAs signed by the EU and the US. While largely demanding similar things 
from developing countries in terms of maintaining and enforcing the existing levels of 
environmental protection and, increasingly, complying with multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) they signed, the EU and the US pursue different enforcement strategies 
                                                          
1
 The EU signs trade agreements on behalf of its member states.  
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with regard to environmental standards in their PTAs. US PTAs envision sanctions in the 
form of withholding trade privileges from their trading partners or a fine in the case of non-
compliance with environmental provisions, while EU PTAs rely on policy dialogue between 
civil society actors and governments in both the EU and its partners to address the issues of 
non-implementation and non-compliance. Previous literature has shown that this variation in 
PTA design matters, especially with regard to labor standards (Postnikov and Bastiaens 
2014), and we expect that the implementation dynamic of environmental standards will also 
be greatly affected by it.    
Our paper adds to the emerging literature on PTA design, their implementation and 
their non-trade effects (e.g. Gray 2014; Kim 2012; Kucik 2012; Postnikov and Bastiaens 
2014; Rudra 2011). Furthermore, our study is the first one, to the best of our knowledge, to 
analyze the effects of PTAs on actual environmental policy outcomes in a large-N fashion. 
Finally, scholars have long argued about the links between international trade and the 
environment (Cole and Elliot 2003; Copeland and Taylor 1995; Birdsall and Wheeler 1993; 
Levinson and Taylor 2008) but failed to acknowledge the potential effects of institutional 
characteristics of trade agreements on environmental policy reform across states, so our paper 
tries to ameliorate this understanding.   
The paper is structured as follows. The second section examines the inclusion of 
environmental provisions in PTAs and focuses on their design. The third section outlines our 
theory and hypotheses. The fourth section provides an empirical test of the hypotheses and 
the last section concludes with theoretical and policy implications.           
 
2. Environmental Standards in EU and US PTAs  
Environmental standards have become thoroughly integrated in EU and US PTAs as a result 
of the failure to address them through the WTO in the 1990s. Developing countries have 
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perceived any attempts by developed countries to link the environment and trade at the 
multilateral level as disguised protectionism and vetoed them at a number of ministerial 
conferences alongside other regulatory issues (also known as the Singapore issues). Ever 
since then, the EU and the US have pursued different approaches towards environmental 
standards, reflecting their respective domestic trade policy-making arrangements.
2
 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) concluded in 1994 is the first US 
PTA to include a separate legally binding environmental chapter known as the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) as a result of the pressure 
from American environmental groups on the Clinton administration and the US Congress. 
NAAEC requires the parties to maintain the existing levels of environmental protection and 
not to derogate from it in order to facilitate trade. All later US PTAs incorporate 
environmental chapters within the main body of the agreement, reflecting the demands of 
environmental lobbyists to treat environmental issues on par with other trade-related aspects 
(and not in a NAFTA-style side chapter). Furthermore, the Trade Policy Act of 2002 that 
extends the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), granted to the US President for speedy 
negotiation and signing of trade deals, requires all US PTAs to include enforceable 
environmental provisions for their successful ratification by the US Congress. This means 
that countries can be sanctioned in the form of losing trade privileges for not upholding their 
environmental commitments.  
A major change to the scope of environmental provisions in US PTAs came from the 
Bipartisan Trade Deal signed in 2007, signifying further success of American environmental 
lobbyists and their alliance with labor unions. The deal mandates US trade negotiators to 
demand that trading partners not only enforce their domestic environmental laws but also 
comply with signed MEAs for successful passage through Congress. Thus, all US PTAs now 
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 Please note that this paper is concerned with the effects of environmental provisions. For the systematic 
analysis of the determinants of different EU and US approaches see Postnikov 2014.   
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have fully enforceable, legally binding environmental provisions that include both domestic 
and international standards.  
The EU has followed a similar trajectory with regard to the inclusion of 
environmental standards, incorporating them in all of its PTAs. The EU-South Africa Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) is the first EU PTA to include the environmental chapter that 
requires parties to maintain an adequate level of environmental protection and not to lower it 
for trade purposes. A new generation of EU PTAs concluded after the publication of the 
European Commission’s communication “Global Europe: Competing in the World” in 2006 
is modeled after the 2010 EU-South Korea PTA that contains one legally binding sustainable 
development chapter covering both environmental and labor standards. These chapters also 
demand parties to comply with MEAs, similar to the requirements made in US PTAs.  
One crucial distinction remains constant between the EU and the US approaches. 
While environmental standards in US PTAs are enforceable through sanctions, the EU choses 
to eschew a coercive approach and relies on soft mechanisms of enforcement. Thus, even if 
environmental standards are legally binding, which means that cases of non-compliance can 
be brought to the expert panel, failing to comply with the rulings of such a panel will not 
result in any real penalty. Instead, the EU solely relies on a mechanism known as the Civil 
Society Dialogue where governments and civil society actors from both the EU and its 
trading partners meet on a regular basis to work together on implementation. The fact that the 
EU relies on a purely dialogical approach with regard to environmental standards in its PTAs 
puts it in a striking contrast with the US’ coercive approach based on sanctions and fines. 
Yet, it is, perhaps, a testimony to the idea of Normative Power Europe that projects EU 
norms and values through persuasion and not coercion (Manners 2002).        
Can environmental standards in PTAs achieve their goals and instigate domestic 
environmental reform in agreement partners in the developing world and do these two 
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approaches also influence agreement outcomes differently? The next section theorizes how 
the design of environmental standards in EU and US PTAs will yield different environmental 
policy outcomes in partner states.          
   
3. Environmental Standards in PTAs as the Mechanisms of Regulatory Change  
Our starting point in theorizing the effects of environmental standards is a long-held 
contention in international relations (IR) literature that the design of international agreements 
is an important factor that can influence agreement effectiveness (e.g. Rosendorff and Milner 
2001), including various social provisions in PTAs, such as human rights and labor standards 
(Hafner-Burton 2009; Kim 2012; Postnikov and Bastiaens 2014). Building on Postnikov and 
Bastiaens (2014), we argue that, indeed, environmental standards in EU and US PTAs do 
achieve their goals but the agreement design matters for how this process occurs. As EU and 
US standards differ in terms of their enforcement, this difference should affect the incentive 
structure of agreement partners in distinct ways. US partners will be motivated to improve 
environmental policies before an agreement enters into force in order to avoid sanctions for 
non-compliance. EU partners, on the other hand, might not be incentivized to reform 
environmental policies urgently, but will do it gradually, as a result of the learning dynamic 
generated by the dialogical approach during the agreement implementation stage. Hence, the 
timing of effects will be different – US PTAs will produce a positive ex ante effect, while EU 
PTAs will produce a positive ex post effect.   
As mentioned above, the US threatens sanctions for non-compliance with its 
environmental standards and their enforceability is an important factor that guarantees 
agreement ratification by the US Congress, as required by both the Trade Policy Act of 2002 
and the Bipartisan Trade Deal of 2007. In fact, the Office of United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), who is responsible for negotiating trade agreements, issues a report 
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and regular updates to the US Congress on environmental policy in future PTA partners 
during the negotiation process. Furthermore, the US reserves the right to conduct a periodical 
review of environmental policies of its PTA partners in order to monitor the implementation 
of and compliance with agreement provisions. The legally binding nature of all US PTAs 
ensures that an independent panel of experts rules on the issues of compliance. Importantly, 
non-compliance is punished by sanctions that involve eliminating trade privileges or, more 
rarely, a large fine, holding agreement partners accountable to the commitments they made 
with regard to environmental policy. 
While sanctions as such have not been applied yet to punish US trading partners for 
failing to implement PTA provisions, Kim (2012) demonstrated that US PTAs’ labor 
provisions are effective and Postnikov and Bastiaens (2014) convincingly argued that this 
effectiveness can be attributed to a fear generated by sanctions that motivates trading partners 
to improve their labor standards prior to signing an agreement with the US in order not to be 
punished in the future, i.e. ex ante. We claim that such a fear of sanctions should also be 
associated with environmental provisions in US PTAs, acting as a credible commitment 
device and motivating domestic policy reform. The cases of Chile and Peru illustrate our 
logic.  
The Chilean environmental movement had been weakened by the years of 
dictatorship and a lack of a proper environmental institutional regime during the neoliberal 
Pinochet reign (Carruthers 2001). With democratization, the first Concertación governments 
of the 1990s strove to institute environmental reform and succeeded with the establishment of 
the National Environmental Framework law in 1994, which also created a new institution for 
executing it, the National Environmental Commission (CONAMA). Soon afterwards, 
proposals for the environmental reform began to emerge. These proposed reforms were 
further legitimized by the new international norms emanating from the Earth Summit in 1992. 
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Yet, there had to be a critical driver to put those proposals in action, ameliorating the 
continued weakness of the Chilean environmental movement.  
In the mid-1990s, Chile was preparing to become the fourth member of NAFTA. 
Tecklin et al. (2011) argue that NAFTA negotiations and the environmental provisions of the 
NAAEC created the sense of urgency needed to put dormant Chilean legislative proposals 
into law, opening the window of opportunity for needed reforms. The US government and 
trade negotiators expected Chile to have environmental protections similar to Mexico’s to be 
able to join NAFTA. In fact, one trade minister even remarked, “Lately, discussions of the 
environment tend to begin and end with the issue of NAFTA. If we begin with NAFTA we 
end up talking about national environmental policies and vice versa” (Tecklin et al. 2011: 
885-886). Thus, the pressure from the enforceable environmental side chapter of NAFTA 
proved to be critical to build support for the environmental reform in Chile. Later, when the 
US-Chile PTA negotiations resumed in the early 2000s, the USTR reviewed the existing 
Chilean environmental law, as was mandated by the US Congress, and was satisfied with it, 
noticing the reforms conducted in the 1990s (USTR 2003). 
In a similar fashion, more recent negotiations between the US and Peru led to an ex 
ante improvement of Peru’s environmental policy, as seen in the establishment of the 
Ministry of Environment in 2008 prior to agreement ratification by the US Congress. This 
major institutional reform came as a result of urgency to meet the requirements of the US-
Peru PTA. And while the leading business groups did not welcome this decision, it invited 
praise from Peruvian environmentalists. In the words of the then President Alan García, “the 
free trade agreement has brought a fundamental call to attention, that we owe to our 
Democrat friends in the US Congress, to strengthen labor rights and the defense of the 
environment. […] I’ll propose to Congress, or perhaps using the authority that was given 
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kindly and democratically by Congress to the Executive, the creation of an Environment 
Ministry” (Peruvian Times 2007).  
Thus, both Chilean and Peruvian cases demonstrate that environmental provisions in 
US PTAs can, indeed, motivate domestic environmental policy reform even in developing 
countries with weak environmental constituencies and even, possibly, in contradiction with 
the interests of organized businesses. Importantly, the effect of these provisions will be 
exhibited ex ante as US trading partners will fear potential sanctions in the future if they fail 
to meet the expectations put upon them.   
 
Hypothesis 1: US PTAs with environmental provisions will be most effective ex-ante in 
promoting environmentally sustainable policies in developing countries.   
 
As mentioned above, contrary to the US’ sticks approach, the EU largely pursues a 
carrots approach when dealing with environmental provisions in its PTAs. It relies on 
mechanisms, such as the Civil Society Dialogue (or Forum), to bring together governmental 
officials and civil society members from both the EU and its trading partners to collectively 
work on the effective implementation of trade agreements and their various provisions, 
including environmental standards. The participants are expected to meet on a regular basis, 
typically at least once a year, and the EU also demands that such dialogues are representative 
of all key stakeholders and not just those organizations that are close to government. Such 
dialogues were shown to be effective with regard to the implementation of labor standards by 
establishing a transnational communication channel for civil society activists from the EU 
and its partners and generating a positive learning environment (Postnikov and Bastiaens 
2014). This policy learning better equips underrepresented civil society groups in the 
developing world when pressing their governments to implement needed domestic reforms. 
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Furthermore, by participating in the dialogue, governments themselves can learn more about 
the demands of civil society groups and the EU’s own legislation, to use later as a template 
when designing proposed policy reforms.  
Ultimately, the policy dialogue established by the EU creates an institutionalized 
channel for transnational communication among various stakeholders and spurs information 
sharing and learning among them, including regulatory frameworks, as argued by various 
scholars (e.g. Holzinger et al. 2008; Rudra 2011). Thus, various domestic actors, including 
governments and environmental officials, in EU partner countries can exchange information 
about environmental issues and policy deficiencies in their countries and become more aware 
about various ways to bring them to the forefront of the political agenda. This, in turn, can 
lead to improvements in environmental policy design. However, it is likely that such a 
learning process will take time as socialization in international institutions is a lengthy, and 
also a cumulative, process requiring various actors to internalize new cognitive and 
normative frames. Thus, the effect of this learning on domestic policy reform will be 
noticeable after an agreement enters into force, i.e. during the implementation stage.            
 
Hypothesis 2: EU PTAs with environmental provisions will be most effective ex-post in 
promoting environmentally sustainable policies in developing countries.   
 
Yet, we argue that the success of environmental policy reform happening as a result 
of policy learning mechanism postulated here will hinge on the capacity of civil society in 
EU PTA partners. Strong and well-organized civil society is a necessary component of 
reform, as governments themselves might not be motivated to instigate any significant 
change in the absence of coercion and negative consequences in the future. Governments in 
the developing world might also lack administrative capacity (for example, not have 
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environmental ministries) needed for domestic reform. Additionally, state officials might be 
captured by the interests of organized businesses whose preferences would dictate 
maintaining the status quo, as investing in environmental protection is bound to incur 
significant costs for them. Moreover, a weak civil society could further undermine the 
lobbying effectiveness of environmental organizations, already a notoriously loose 
constituency in developing countries comprised of diverse actors driven by their value 
agendas. Thus, any positive ex post effect of environmental provisions in EU PTAs is likely 
to occur only in the countries with relatively strong and well-organized civil societies.    
       
Hypothesis 3: EU PTAs with environmental provisions will be effective in promoting 
environmentally sustainable policies in developing countries with strong civil societies. 
 
The case of implementation of the EU-Chile Association Agreement illustrates the 
logic of previous two hypotheses. Despite the fact that the agreement was concluded in 2002, 
it had only few positive effects on environmental policy in Chile. The change could be seen 
only at the level of attitudes among the relevant Chilean officials and did not lead to any real 
policy adjustment. An interviewed high-level Chilean diplomat involved in the EU-Chile 
relations mentioned that there has been certain legitimization of environmental issues within 
the government bureaucracy stemming from the general obligations created by the agreement 
and the dialogue established with the EU (author’s interview June 5, 2013). This 
legitimization has elevated the level of environmental concerns, especially in the south of 
Chile, where the cellulose plants are hurting the native flora, which has been increasingly 
brought to the attention of the Chilean public and policy-makers and which has also received 
a lot of attention in the EU.     
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There have also been several exchanges of views between officials from the EU and 
the Ministry of Environment in Chile that did not lead to any substantive changes, beyond 
establishing a new informational channel, due to the lack of interest from Ministry officials, 
(author’s interview May 31, 2013). Additionally, the Ministry of Environment was 
established only in 2010, which occurred largely due to the pressure from the Organization 
for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD). Despite this positive change, the new 
Ministry experiences administrative problems and has only limited enforcement capacity over 
the environmental regulations it inherited from its predecessor CONAMA (Government 
Accountability Office 2009).   
Furthermore, despite the environment being discussed at the Civil Society Dialogue 
meetings, little progress has been made in terms of improving environmental policy, as 
environmental provisions were treated as marginal by the agreement parties at those meetings 
(author’s interview June 5, 2013). Importantly, the lack of organizational capacity of Chilean 
civil society coupled with the unwilling government resulted in only two Civil Society 
Dialogue meetings in more than a decade, despite the stipulation that they need to be held 
annually.    
The Chilean environmental movement exhibits certain pathologies it inherited from 
the Pinochet era (Carruthers 2001). It is quite eclectic and lacks institutional capacity, as well 
as crucial material resources. Its lobbying efforts are weak and virtually non-existent with 
few small NGOs mostly relying on personal ties with policy-makers (author’s interviews 
June 10, 2013b; June 17, 2013). This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the Chilean 
political system has very few formal lobbying channels for societal actors that can be largely 
attributed to the absence of law on lobbying. In addition to this organizational weakness, the 
Chilean society is not well mobilized when it comes to environmental protection, as 
evidenced by the tolerance of high levels of air pollution in Santiago (author’s interview June 
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10, 2013b). Thus, the weakness of the Chilean environmental movement resulted in the lack 
of fulfillment of the agreement obligations and many “missed opportunities” (Reyes-Mendy 
2009).  
This case clearly demonstrates that well-organized civil society is a necessary 
condition for the policy dialogue envisioned by EU PTAs to begin and incentivize domestic 
reform. Yet, the US might also deal with weak civil society in its trading partners. However, 
we argue that the threat of US sanctions will be sufficient to mobilize governments to engage 
in action even without strong pressure from civil society, as possible sanctions will mainly 
hurt government officials and business groups they respond to who would lose a significant 
share of the attractive American market due to losing trade privileges.   
 
Hypothesis 4: US PTAs with environmental provisions will be effective in promoting 
environmentally sustainable policies in developing countries regardless of civil society 
strength.   
 
4. Empirical Analysis  
 
In this section, we empirically test our hypotheses concerning the ex ante and ex post effects 
of EU and US PTAs with environmental provisions in all partner states and then partner 
states with varying strengths of civil society. We hypothesize that EU PTAs will be most 
effective ex post due to learning by governments and civil society actors. In particular, EU 
PTAs will be effective in partner states with strong civil societies, where the domestic 
institutional environment is most conducive to the learning process. We expect US PTAs to 
be most effective ex ante because of the fear of sanctions by governments in trading partners. 
Thus, in states with either strong or weak civil societies, US PTAs are predicted to be 
effective. Our sample consists of 79 developing countries between 1980 and 2010, including 
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all US and EU PTA trading partners. For further information on US and EU PTAs please see 
Appendix B.1 and B.2.  
 Our dependent variable of interest is commitment to environmentally sustainable 
policies in EU and US PTA partners. Using a policy oriented measure as our dependent 
variable is critical because maintaining and enforcing adequate levels of environmental 
protection and committing to MEAs is expected of PTA partners and will involve changing 
existing environmental policies if a policy gap exists. Additionally, this operationalization 
distinguishes our analysis from previous research on the impact of free trade and free trade 
agreements on the environment, which focuses primarily on (air) pollution as the dependent 
variable (e.g. Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor 1998; Birdsall and Wheeler 1993; Frankel and 
Rose 2005; Strutt and Anderson 2000). Pollution is only one component of the measurement 
of a country’s overall environmental quality. Here, we prefer a measure that captures the 
environmental policy commitments made in PTAs beyond pollution.  
Specifically, we operationalize environmental sustainability using Yale University 
and Colombia University’s Environmental Performance Index (EPI) (Yale University et al. 
2014). The EPI is an aggregation of both environmental health and ecosystem vitality 
measures including air quality, water and sanitation, health, water resources, agriculture, 
forests, fisheries, biodiversity and habitat, and climate and energy. Importantly, the EPI uses 
a “’proximity to target’ methodology, which assesses how close a particular country is to an 
identified policy target… defined primarily by international or national policy goals or 
established scientific thresholds” (Yale University et al. 2014).3 This definition echoes the 
scope of environmental standards in both EU and US PTAs.
4
 This variable is scaled from 0 to 
                                                          
3
 Please see details on methodology on the EPI website: http://epi.yale.edu/our-methods. 
4
 For example, Chapter 18 of the US-Peru PTA dedicated to the environment defines environmental law as (a) 
the prevention, abatement, or control of the release, discharge, or emission of pollutants or environmental 
contaminants; (b) the control of environmentally hazardous or toxic chemicals, substances, materials, and 
wastes, and the dissemination of information related thereto; (c) the protection or conservation of wild flora or 
fauna, including endangered  species, their habitat, and specially protected natural areas; or  
15 
 
100 with higher values indicating higher environmental health and sustainability 
performance.
5
  
 Our independent variables of interest are EU and US PTAs with environmental 
provisions. We examined the text of all EU and US PTAs to determine (1) if the agreements 
included environmental provisions and (2) the enforcement mechanism specified in the 
agreement. As discussed previously, the United States relies on coercive enforcement 
mechanisms and the overwhelming majority (18/21) of US PTAs with environmental 
provisions include sanctions for non-compliance. The EU, on the other hand, uses “soft” 
mechanisms of enforcement in the form of government consultations and Civil Society 
Dialogue; no EU PTA with environmental provisions envisions sanctions. Instead, the EU 
relies on policy dialogue for implementation of PTA provisions in partner states. Please see 
Appendix B.1 and B.2 for details on EU and US PTAs.  
Ultimately, we have four key independent variables of interest: a dummy variable 
indicating a country is negotiating a US PTA with environmental provisions and sanctions, a 
dummy variable indicating a country has a signed US PTA with environmental provisions 
and sanctions, a dummy variable indicating a country is negotiating an EU PTA with 
environmental provisions, and a dummy variable indicating a country has a signed EU PTA 
with environmental provisions. The negotiation period is operationalized as three years 
before signing the PTA, in accordance with Kim (2012) and Postnikov and Bastiaens (2014) 
studies of labor standards. In the sample of all developing countries, we expect the US PTA 
negotiation dummy to be positively associated with environmentally sustainable policies, 
while the EU PTA signed dummy variable is predicted to positive and statistically significant, 
reflecting hypotheses 1 and 2.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(d) for Peru, the management of forest resources. The EU’s list of thirteen areas of cooperation established in its 
sustainable development chapters emphasizes similar measures (e.g. Chapter 13 of the EU-South Korea PTA). 
5
 Please note that alternative measures of environmentally sustainable policies, such as the World Bank’s 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment: Environmental Sustainability, are not used due to data availability 
concerns.  
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 Building on Postnikov and Bastiaens (2014), we control for key economic and 
political factors. In particular, we include GDP growth, GDP (logged), GDP per capita, and 
trade (as a percent of GDP) to capture the overall economic development and economic 
growth that might affect environmental policy commitments (World Bank 2013). Democracy 
and the number of veto players capture the political environment (Henisz 2000; Marshall and 
Gurr 2010). Freedom of association, scaled from zero to two with higher values indicating 
greater freedoms for citizens to assemble and associate, captures the strength of civil society 
(CIRI 2010). We also control for environmental factors: land area (logged), carbon dioxide 
emissions per capita, and fossil fuel consumption as a percentage of total energy consumption 
(World Bank 2013). Finally, we include a time trend and year fixed effects.
6
  See Appendix 
B.3 for details on all variables. We test our hypotheses 1 and 2 using fixed effects 
estimations.
7
 See Table 1 below for base and full model results.    
 As expected, US PTAs with environmental provisions are positive and statistically 
significant in predicting environmental sustainability in developing countries ex ante (i.e. 
during the negotiations period). In fact, the greatest improvement in environmentally 
sustainable policies for US PTA partner states occurs during the negotiations period, 
compared to the period after the agreement is signed (ex post). Importantly, EU PTAs are 
positive and statistically significant in predicting environmental sustainability in developing 
country partner states ex post (i.e. after the agreement is signed).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 We include a dummy variable for a country that has signed either an EU or US PTA, however the US PTA is 
dropped during the de-meaning process of the fixed effects regression. Results including a dummy variable for 
countries that have signed both an EU and US PTA is robust, see Appendix A.1.  
7
 Please note that the models are robust when lagging the economic independent variables (Postnikov and 
Bastiaens (2014)).  
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Table 1: Determinants of Environmental Protection Index in Developing Countries 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
       
US Negotiations Dummy 0.349*    
 (0.203)    
EU Negotiations Dummy  -0.0459   
  (0.204)   
US Sign Dummy   -0.0604  
   (0.203)  
EU Sign Dummy    0.427* 
    (0.226) 
Trade (% GDP) -0.00861*** -0.00840*** -0.00842*** -0.00843*** 
 
(0.00321) (0.00321) (0.00321) (0.00320) 
Polity 0.0351 0.0381 0.0368 0.0342 
 (0.0236) (0.0235) (0.0236) (0.0236) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.111 -0.101 -0.0894 -0.0542 
 
(0.199) (0.198) (0.202) (0.198) 
GDP growth 0.0137 0.0134 0.0133 0.0130 
 
(0.00965) (0.00966) (0.00967) (0.00964) 
Carbon Dioxide per capita -0.0439 -0.0403 -0.0427 -0.0495* 
 
(0.0291) (0.0288) (0.0291) (0.0292) 
Fossil Fuel Consumption 
(%) -0.0618*** -0.0614*** -0.0612*** -0.0614*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0126) 
Veto Players -0.254 -0.285 -0.287 -0.276 
 
(0.316) (0.316) (0.316) (0.315) 
Freedom of Assembly 0.0417 0.0410 0.0412 0.0331 
 
(0.0740) (0.0742) (0.0742) (0.0741) 
Time Trend 0.307*** 0.308*** 0.305*** 0.297*** 
 
(0.0252) (0.0244) (0.0259) (0.0249) 
Land Area (log) 13.40 6.741 7.868 6.140 
 
(18.33) (17.95) (18.34) (17.91) 
 
   
 Observations 972 972 972 972 
R-squared 0.502 0.500 0.500 0.502 
Number of Countries 92 92 92 92 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
We also conduct robustness checks using alternative measures of the dependent and 
independent variables and a different estimation technique. First, we estimate a panel 
regression including a dummy variable for countries that have signed both EU and US PTAs 
(Appendix A.1). Results are robust. Second, we employ the number of MEAs ratified each 
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year as the dependent variable of interest (Mitchell 2014). This operationalization of the 
dependent variable is critical, as both EU and US specify complying with MEAs within the 
environmental provisions of their PTAs. More broadly, MEAs capture each country’s 
commitment to environmental reform on the international stage, thus, signing MEAs will 
signify governments’ overall determination to improve its environmental policies. In this 
model, we include WTO membership (WTO 2013) and the environmental performance index 
(Yale University et al. 2014) as additional controls.
8
 See Appendix A.2 for the negative 
binomial estimation results. Hypothesis 1 and 2 are further supported. Furthermore, negative 
result for US sign dummy indicates that the fear of sanctions is highest while an agreement is 
negotiated and gradually dissipates afterwards, as US trading partners make improvements 
they deem necessary to satisfy the concerns of American negotiators and might even 
backslide if the US takes a lackadaisical approach to monitoring during the implementation 
stage.
9
  
Next, we measure the independent variable of interest as a scale. This variable is 
coded zero to two to represent the pre-negotiations period, the negotiations period, and the 
post-negotiations period of the EU or US PTA (with environmental provisions) respectively. 
The negotiations phase ends with the signing of the PTA. As we expect an inverted-U shape 
of the US PTA’s effect on environmental protections (with the greatest positive effect 
occurring during negotiations), we include a squared term of the US PTA scale variable. 
Ultimately, we expect the EU PTA scale to be positive and statistically significant, the linear 
term of the US PTA scale to be positive and statistically significant, and the quadratic term of 
the US PTA scale to be negative and statistically significant in predicting environmental 
sustainability. Appendix A.3 confirms these expectations highlighting how the greatest 
                                                          
8
 This follows Egger et al. (2011) who control for free trade agreement membership and environmental 
conditions in determining MEA membership.   
9
 This finding echoes the GAO report (2009) assessing the agreement implementation that finds that US partners 
become more sluggish in continuing reforms in the ex post stage.   
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positive effect of EU PTAs occurs after signing, while US PTAs have a curvilinear 
relationship with environmental sustainability (with the greatest positive effect occurring 
during negotiations).  
Finally, we estimate a Heckman selection model to address potential non-random 
participation in EU and US free trade agreements. In particular, this model accounts for the 
possibility that the conditions associated with entering into an EU or US PTA may also be 
associated with environmental policies and protections. In the Heckman selection model, the 
dependent variable in the first stage is a dummy variable for countries that have entered into 
EU and US PTAs, while the second stage’s dependent variable is the index of environmental 
sustainability. Following Postnikov and Bastiaens (2014), we control for the following 
factors in the first stage estimation: exports of goods and services (% GDP), trade (% GDP), 
GDP (logged), democracy, veto players, distance from Brussels and DC, railways and air 
carriers (logged), carbon dioxide emissions per capita and fossil fuel energy consumption 
(Haveman 2013; Henisz 2000; Marshall and Gurr 2010; World Bank 2013). Table A.4 in the 
Appendix highlights the robust results.   
To assess the validity of hypotheses 3 and 4 on the effectiveness of EU and US PTAs 
in countries with varying degrees of civil society strength, we employ fixed effects 
regressions on a split sample of countries based on their degree of freedom of assembly and 
association (CIRI 2010). Countries with strong civil societies have a freedom of assembly 
equaling two, rights to assemble and associate are “virtually unrestricted and freely enjoyed”, 
while countries with weak civil societies have a freedom of assembly equaling one or zero, 
indicating rights are “severely restricted or denied” to all citizens or select groups (CIRI 
2010). We expect both EU and US PTAs with environmental provisions to be effective (ex 
post and ex ante respectively) in countries with strong civil societies and only US PTAs to be 
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effective in countries with relatively weak civil societies. Table 2 and 3 present the regression 
results.  
Table 2: Determinants of Environmental Protection Index in Developing Countries with 
Strong Civil Societies 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
       
US Negotiations Dummy 0.563    
 (0.368)    
EU Negotiations Dummy  0.222   
  (0.353)   
US Sign Dummy   -0.293  
   (0.362)  
EU Sign Dummy    0.723* 
    (0.374) 
Trade (% GDP) -0.0302*** -0.0288*** -0.0294*** -0.0343*** 
 
(0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0110) 
Polity 0.207** 0.198** 0.200** 0.182* 
 (0.0976) (0.0981) (0.0980) (0.0974) 
GDP per capita (log) -1.032** -0.925* -1.010* -0.964* 
 
(0.514) (0.511) (0.522) (0.507) 
GDP growth -0.0165 -0.0165 -0.0157 -0.00562 
 
(0.0275) (0.0273) (0.0276) (0.0276) 
Carbon Dioxide per capita -0.00830 0.00276 -0.00551 -0.0218 
 
(0.0513) (0.0496) (0.0517) (0.0510) 
Fossil Fuel Consumption 
(%) -0.0933*** -0.0863*** -0.0903*** -0.0833*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0263) (0.0270) (0.0261) 
Veto Players 1.059 1.071 1.113 1.081 
 
(0.811) (0.811) (0.815) (0.804) 
Time Trend 0.411*** 0.405*** 0.416*** 0.390*** 
 
(0.0526) (0.0517) (0.0561) (0.0516) 
Land Area (log) 124.9 117.7 130.1 88.44 
 
(101.1) (101.2) (102.7) (101.3) 
 
   
 Observations 266 266 266 266 
R-squared 0.564 0.559 0.560 0.567 
Number of Countries 50 50 50 50 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Determinants of Environmental Protection Index in Developing Countries with 
Weak Civil Societies 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
       
US Negotiations Dummy 0.557**    
 (0.265)    
EU Negotiations Dummy  -0.117   
  (0.247)   
US Sign Dummy   -0.191  
   (0.268)  
EU Sign Dummy    -0.174 
    (0.305) 
Trade (% GDP) -0.00673** -0.00652** -0.00655** -0.00665** 
 
(0.00306) (0.00307) (0.00307) (0.00307) 
Polity 0.00424 0.00735 0.00615 0.00835 
 (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0228) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.213 0.208 0.216 0.195 
 
(0.212) (0.209) (0.214) (0.212) 
GDP growth 0.0205** 0.0196** 0.0196** 0.0206** 
 
(0.00948) (0.00945) (0.00951) (0.00952) 
Carbon Dioxide per capita -0.0902*** -0.0898*** -0.0881*** -0.0892*** 
 
(0.0336) (0.0337) (0.0339) (0.0337) 
Fossil Fuel Consumption 
(%) -0.0411*** -0.0416*** -0.0417*** -0.0413*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136) 
Veto Players 0.379 0.325 0.337 0.335 
 
(0.345) (0.345) (0.346) (0.345) 
Time Trend 0.255*** 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.260*** 
 
(0.0273) (0.0264) (0.0278) (0.0272) 
Land Area (log) 9.718 -3.560 1.044 -3.300 
 
(17.75) (16.72) (17.71) (16.70) 
 
   
 Observations 713 713 713 713 
R-squared 0.522 0.519 0.519 0.519 
Number of Countries 85 85 85 85 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
While EU PTAs with environmental provisions are effective in improving 
environmental conditions in countries with strong civil societies (and this effect is strongest 
ex post), US PTAs are not statistically significant. We attribute this result to the fact that 
countries negotiating a PTA with the US should already have relatively high levels of 
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environmental protection and the gap between US expectations and existing policies is 
relatively small, as confirmed by the data, indicating that many of US PTA partners are 
middle-income countries with already existing environmental laws. Hypothesis 4 is supported 
by the regression results, as US PTAs are effective during the negotiation period in 
improving the environmental policy environment in countries even with low levels of 
freedom of assembly, as sanctions provide the necessary stick for the government to improve 
environmental policies. EU PTAs with environmental provisions are not effective, as the 
channels for learning are weak due to the absence of necessary platform in the form of Civil 
Society Dialogue and the incentive provided by sanctions is non-existent.  
As a robustness check we interact freedom of assembly with the PTA stage variable 
(coded zero to two to represent the pre-negotiations period, the negotiations period, and the 
post-negotiations period of the EU or US PTA with environmental protections) and run a 
fixed effects regression on the full sample of developing countries. Appendix Table A.5 and 
Figures A.6 and A.7 provide the robust estimation results for EU PTAs, i.e. they are most 
effective in countries with robust civil societies as indicated by the high levels of freedom of 
association. The US PTA-civil society interaction is not statistically significant, indicating 
that the major driver of policy change for US trading partners is the fear of future sanctions 
by governments and not the civil society involvement. 
 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper we argued that North-South PTAs with environmental provisions can serve as 
the vehicles of environmental policy change in the developing world. However, their effect 
will be conditioned by the design of an agreement. US PTAs employ sanctions to punish 
countries for non-compliance with environmental commitments, while EU PTAs envision 
dialogue between civil society actors and governments. We hypothesized that these 
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approaches should result in two mechanisms of policy change – a fear of possible sanctions 
manifested by ex ante environmental policy improvements in US PTA partners or policy 
learning as a result of the dialogue established by EU PTAs manifested ex post.  
By refining the understanding of these mechanisms and their effects, our paper further 
contributes to the literature on PTAs as a source of domestic reform and the timing of PTA 
effects (Baccini and Urpelainen 2014a; Baccini and Urpelainen 2014b), as well as the vast 
literature on trade policy and development more broadly. Additionally, our paper has 
important policy implications for future trade agreements negotiated by the developed 
countries. While sanctions can clearly lead to the improvement of environmental protection, 
the softer approach can also be effective when linked with stronger civil society in partner 
states. Thus, policy dialogue can be used as a policy instrument but it needs to be supplanted 
by various initiatives to strengthen civil society participation. Properly implementing 
environmental provisions will ensure that PTAs can serve not only commercial but also 
developmental purposes.         
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Appendix A 
 
A.1 Determinants of Environmental Protection Index in Developing Countries: 
Robustness Check  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
       
US Negotiations Dummy 0.340*    
 (0.203)    
EU Negotiations Dummy  -0.0459   
  (0.204)   
US Sign Dummy   -0.0570  
   (0.203)  
EU Sign Dummy    0.427* 
    (0.226) 
Trade (% GDP) -0.00858*** -0.00840*** -0.00840*** -0.00843*** 
 
(0.00321) (0.00321) (0.00321) (0.00320) 
Polity 0.0364 0.0381 0.0379 0.0342 
 (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0236) (0.0236) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.131 -0.101 -0.108 -0.0542 
 
(0.198) (0.198) (0.200) (0.198) 
GDP growth 0.0139 0.0134 0.0135 0.0130 
 
(0.00964) (0.00966) (0.00966) (0.00964) 
Carbon Dioxide per capita -0.0407 -0.0403 -0.0400 -0.0495* 
 
(0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0289) (0.0292) 
Fossil Fuel Consumption 
(%) -0.0625*** -0.0614*** -0.0618*** -0.0614*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0126) 
Veto Players -0.248 -0.285 -0.280 -0.276 
 
(0.316) (0.316) (0.316) (0.315) 
Freedom of Assembly 0.0416 0.0410 0.0412 0.0331 
 
(0.0740) (0.0742) (0.0741) (0.0741) 
Time Trend 0.312*** 0.308*** 0.309*** 0.297*** 
 
(0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0252) (0.0249) 
Land Area (log) 13.23 6.741 7.814 6.140 
 
(18.33) (17.95) (18.33) (17.91) 
Both EU and US PTA 50.21 32.95 35.81 31.23 
 (48.52) (47.49) (48.53) (47.40) 
 
   
 Observations 972 972 972 972 
R-squared 0.502 0.500 0.500 0.502 
Number of Countries 92 92 92 92 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A.2 Determinants of Multilateral Environmental Agreements in Force in Developing 
Countries 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
       
US Negotiations Dummy 0.368**    
 (0.153)    
EU Negotiations Dummy  -0.234   
  (0.161)   
US Sign Dummy   -0.267*  
   (0.153)  
EU Sign Dummy    0.509*** 
    (0.170) 
Trade (% GDP) 0.00411 0.00408 0.00416 0.00396 
 
(0.00270) (0.00272) (0.00270) (0.00271) 
Polity -0.00160 0.00457 -0.00107 0.000251 
 (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0196) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.0456 -0.00781 0.0337 0.0487 
 
(0.154) (0.154) (0.156) (0.154) 
GDP growth 0.00168 0.00213 0.00179 0.00209 
 
(0.00814) (0.00822) (0.00815) (0.00818) 
EPI  -0.0541** -0.0503* -0.0514* -0.0559** 
 (0.0265) (0.0267) (0.0264) (0.0266) 
Carbon Dioxide per capita -0.0395* -0.0242 -0.0361 -0.0355 
 
(0.0226) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0227) 
Fossil Fuel Consumption 
(%) -0.00782 -0.00614 -0.00778 -0.00806 
 (0.00995) (0.0100) (0.00999) (0.0100) 
Veto Players 0.106 0.0871 0.0874 0.0990 
 
(0.257) (0.259) (0.258) (0.258) 
Freedom of Assembly 0.0551 0.0413 0.0516 0.0424 
 
(0.0593) (0.0598) (0.0594) (0.0596) 
Time Trend -0.0599*** -0.0497** -0.0571*** -0.0596*** 
 
(0.0216) (0.0212) (0.0221) (0.0214) 
WTO 0.329 0.303 0.321 0.339 
 
(0.210) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) 
     
Observations 972 972 972 972 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A.3 Determinants of Environmental Protection Index in Developing Countries: 
Alternative Measurement of PTA 
 
 
(1) (2) 
    
US PTA Scale 1.078**  
 (0.493)  
US PTA Scale Squared -0.439**  
 (0.214)  
EU PTA Scale  0.285** 
  (0.135) 
Trade (% GDP) -0.00862*** -0.00829*** 
 
(0.00321) (0.00320) 
Polity 0.0353 0.0331 
 (0.0236) (0.0236) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.0668 -0.0179 
 
(0.202) (0.200) 
GDP growth 0.0135 0.0132 
 
(0.00965) (0.00963) 
Carbon Dioxide per capita -0.0471 -0.0527* 
 
(0.0291) (0.0294) 
Fossil Fuel Consumption (%) -0.0608*** -0.0618*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0126) 
Veto Players -0.256 -0.269 
 
(0.316) (0.315) 
Freedom of Assembly 0.0438 0.0330 
 
(0.0740) (0.0741) 
Time Trend 0.297*** 0.293*** 
 
(0.0261) (0.0252) 
Land Area (log) 11.54 6.060 
 
(18.38) (17.90) 
 
  
Observations 972 972 
R-squared 0.503 0.503 
Number of Countries 92 92 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
A.4 Determinants of Environmental Protection Index in Developing Countries: 
Selection Model 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
       
US Negotiations Dummy 1.529*    
 (0.894)    
EU Negotiations Dummy  1.189   
  (1.438)   
US Sign Dummy   0.262  
   (1.038)  
EU Sign Dummy    4.488* 
    (2.445) 
Trade (% GDP) -0.0778*** -0.0834*** -0.0822*** -0.123*** 
 
(0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0253) (0.0423) 
Polity 0.0386 0.0702 0.0667 -0.0264 
 (0.239) (0.230) (0.235) (0.360) 
GDP per capita (log) 3.300 2.595 2.389 0.628 
 
(2.820) (2.661) (2.742) (4.076) 
GDP growth -0.0598 -0.0515 -0.0703 -0.0460 
 
(0.136) (0.136) (0.135) (0.202) 
Carbon Dioxide per capita -1.424*** -1.312*** -1.229** -0.796 
 
(0.516) (0.492) (0.511) (0.779) 
Fossil Fuel Consumption 
(%) -0.590*** -0.589*** -0.612*** -0.898*** 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.220) 
Veto Players 7.499** 7.713** 8.043** 6.763 
 
(3.164) (3.088) (3.170) (4.751) 
Land Area (logged) -4.056*** -4.031*** -4.044*** -5.022*** 
 (0.850) (0.828) (0.886) (1.389) 
Freedom of Assembly 0.218 0.129 -0.00303 -0.0648 
 
(0.625) (0.614) (0.621) (0.910) 
Time Trend -0.146 -0.123 -0.128 -0.120 
 
(0.247) (0.239) (0.244) (0.365) 
     
Selection Equation     
 
    
Railways (logged) -0.429*** -0.429*** -0.429*** -0.429*** 
 (0.0976) (0.0976) (0.0976) (0.0976) 
Exports of Goods and 
Services (% GDP) -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.104*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0205) 
GDP (logged) 0.801*** 0.801*** 0.801*** 0.801*** 
 (0.0958) (0.0958) (0.0958) (0.0958) 
Distance from Brussels 
(logged) -0.0882 -0.0882 -0.0882 -0.0882 
 (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) 
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Distance from DC 
(logged) -2.215*** -2.215*** -2.215*** -2.215*** 
 (0.337) (0.337) (0.337) (0.337) 
Workers’ Rights 0.364** 0.364** 0.364** 0.364** 
 (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) 
Women’s Economic 
Rights -0.271 -0.271 -0.271 -0.271 
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.186) (0.186) 
Trade (% GDP) 0.0692*** 0.0692*** 0.0692*** 0.0692*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0114) 
Polity 0.0400* 0.0400* 0.0400* 0.0400* 
 (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) 
     
Observations 895 895 895 895 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A.5 Determinants of Environmental Protection Index in Developing Countries: 
Controlling for Civil Society 
 
 
(1) (2) 
    
Freedom of Assembly 0.0884 -0.0367 
 (0.0812) (0.0804) 
US PTA Scale 1.891**  
 (0.912)  
US PTA Scale Squared -0.794*  
 (0.446)  
US PTA Scale*Freedom of Assembly -0.614  
 (0.580)  
US PTA Scale Squared*Freedom of Assembly 0.260  
 (0.291)  
EU PTA Scale  0.0552 
  (0.171) 
EU PTA Scale*Freedom of Assembly  0.184** 
  (0.0836) 
Trade (% GDP) -0.00849*** -0.00883*** 
 
(0.00321) (0.00320) 
Polity 0.0336 0.0326 
 (0.0236) (0.0236) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.0426 -0.0789 
 
(0.203) (0.202) 
GDP growth 0.0133 0.0151 
 
(0.00965) (0.00965) 
Carbon Dioxide per capita -0.0487* -0.0566* 
 
(0.0292) (0.0294) 
Fossil Fuel Consumption (%) -0.0607*** -0.0605*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0126) 
Veto Players -0.241 -0.232 
 
(0.316) (0.315) 
Time Trend 0.296*** 0.298*** 
 
(0.0261) (0.0253) 
Land Area (log) 16.75 6.914 
 
(19.38) (17.87) 
 
  
Observations 972 972 
R-squared 0.504 0.505 
Number of Countries 92 92 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A.6 Marginal Effect of EU PTAs on Environmental Protection Index at Various Levels 
of Freedom of Assembly 
 
 
 
 
 
A.7 Marginal Effect of Civil Society on Environmental Protection Index at Various 
Stages of EU PTA Negotiations  
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Appendix B 
 
B.1 List of US PTAs 
 
Partner Country Signed In force Enviro Provisions Sanctions 
Albania 1995 1998 no no 
Australia  2004 2005 yes yes 
Bahrain 2005 2006 yes yes 
Canada 1992 1994 yes yes 
Chile 2003 2004 yes yes 
Colombia 2006 2012 yes yes 
Dominican Republic 2004 2007 yes yes 
Israel 1985 1985 no no 
Jordan 2000 2001 yes yes 
Mexico 1992 1994 yes yes 
Morocco 2004 2006 yes yes 
Oman  2006 2009 yes yes 
Peru  2006 2009 yes yes 
Nicaragua 2004 2007 yes yes 
Singapore 2003 2004 yes yes 
South Korea 2010 2012 yes yes 
Vietnam 2000 2001 no no 
Costa Rica 2004 2009 yes yes 
El Salvador 2004 2007 yes yes 
Guatemala 2004 2007 yes yes 
Honduras 2004 2007 yes yes 
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B.2 List of EU PTAs 
 
Partner Country Signed In Force Enviro Provision Sanctions 
Albania 2006 2009 yes no 
Algeria 2002 2005 yes no 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008 2008 yes no 
Botswana 2009 -- yes no 
Cameroon 2009 -- yes no 
Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, St Lucia, St 
Vincent and the 
Grenadines, St Kitts and 
Nevis, Suriname, 
Trinidad and Tobago 2008 -- yes no 
Chile 2002 2003 yes no 
Columbia 2011 2013 yes no 
Côte d'Ivoire 2008 -- no no 
Croatia 2001 2005 yes no 
Egypt 2001 2004 yes no 
Fiji 2009 2009 no no 
Israel 1995 2000 yes no 
Jordan 1997 2002 yes no 
Lebanon 2002 2003 yes no 
Lesotho 2009 -- yes no 
Macedonia 2001 2004 yes no 
Madagascar  2009 2012 yes no 
Mauritius  2009 2012 yes no 
Mexico 2000 2000 yes no 
Montenegro 2007 2010 yes no 
Morocco 1996 2000 yes no 
Mozambique 2009 -- yes no 
Palestine 1997 1997 yes no 
Papua New Guinea  2009 2011 no no 
Peru 2011 2013 yes no 
Serbia  2008 2010 yes no 
Seychelles  2009 2012 yes no 
South Africa 1999 2000 yes no 
South Korea 2010 2011 yes no 
Swaziland 2009 -- yes no 
Tunisia 1995 1998 yes no 
Turkey 1995 1995 yes no 
Zimbabwe  2009 2012 yes no 
35 
 
B.3 Data Descriptions and Sources (All Developing Countries) 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Source 
Empowerment 
index 
7.29 4.01 0 14 CIRI. 2010. 
Environmental 
Performance 
Index 
48.27 8.00 25.2 69.3 Yale University et al. 
2014. 
EU PTA with 
Environmental 
Provisions 
(Signed) 
0.04 0.20 0 1  
Freedom of 
Assembly 
0.94 0.84 0 2 CIRI. 2010. 
GDP Growth 3.61 6.69 -51.03 106.28 World Bank. 2014. 
GDP per 
capita (logged) 
7.38 1.44 4.16 12.13 World Bank. 2014. 
Multilateral 
Environmental 
Agreement  
4.12 6.58 0 93 Mitchell. 2014. 
Polity 
-0.19 6.77 -10 10 Marshall and Gurr. 
2010. 
Trade (% 
GDP) 
83.57 51.57 0.31 460.47 World Bank. 2014. 
US PTA with 
Environmental 
Provisions and 
Sanctions 
(Signed) 
0.02 0.14 0 1  
US PTA with 
Environmental 
Provisions and 
Sanctions 
(negotiations) 
0.01 0.09 0 1  
EU PTA with 
Environmental 
Provisions and 
Sanctions 
(negotiations) 
0.02 0.15 0 1  
Veto Players  0.25 0.29 0 0.89 Henisz. 2000.  
Carbon 
Dioxide per 
capita 
40.46 2363.91 0.00 161316.1 World Bank. 2014. 
Land area 
(logged) 
10.70 3.12 0.69 16.61 World Bank. 2014. 
 
            
